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FOUNDATIONS, RESULTS AND PERSPECTIVES OF 
TRANSITION: A CASE OF SERBIA 
 
Abstract 
 
Paper considers the foundations, results and perspectives of transition 
process, with special focus on Serbia. The foundations were the postulats of 
neoclassical economics, the mainstream in recent economic thought. They 
determined the goal, the methodology, and the ideological basis of this process, 
and resulted especially in Washington Consensus. The results of the reforms, 
based on Consensus, showed, with some exceptions, that these countries realized 
deep and long-term economic fall, followed by similar processes in other spheres. 
Contrary to ordinary opinions that transition crisis show as result of 
inconsistency in reforms taking, this is normaly its result. As an analogue is the 
Morgenthau’s plan for West Germany observed, that has promoted Germany to 
industrial disarmament, and that would lead to its poverty and its transformation 
into raw material basis for the developed economies, and to impossibility of 
survival of the existing number of population. Fortunately for the Germany, 
Morgenthau’s plan was abandoned and Marshall’s plan was introduced. It lead 
to industrial renewal of Germany. For the transition countries it is also 
necessary, considering the practice and basic principles of the Other Canon, 
which have they origins as far as from the economic policy of Henry VII, to acess 
re-industrialization in the same way, which is the necessity for renewall of 
economies, and for overcoming the long-term crisis. 
 
Key words: Standard theory, Other canon, Washington Consensus, Transition 
crisis, Neoclassical economics, Industrialization, Morgenthau’s Plan, Marshall’s 
plan, Development 
 
ОСНОВИ, РЕЗУЛТАТИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЕ ТРАНЗИЦИЈЕ: 
ПРИМЕР СРБИЈЕ 
 
Апстракт 
 
Рад разматра основе, резултате и перспективе процеса транзиције, с 
посебним освртом на Србију. Основе су чинили постулати неокласичне 
економије, главног тока у данашњој економској мисли. Они су определили 
циљ, методологију и идеолошку основу овог процеса, и резултовали су 
Вашингтонским консензусом. Резултати реформи у тзв. 
посткомунистичким земљама, заснованих на Консензусу, показују, уз мање 
изузетке, дубок и дуготрајан економски пад, уз негативне процесе и у 
другим сферама. Насупрот уобичајеним мишљењима да је транзициона 
криза резултат недоследности у спровођењу реформи, она је управо 
супротно њихов закономеран резултат. Као аналог истиче се Моргентауов 
план за З. Немачку, којим је након Другог светског рата било предвиђено да 
она буде индустријски разоружана, што би водило њеном сиромашењу и 
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претварању у сировински додатак развијеним привредама, и онемогућило 
опстанак тадашњег броја становника. На срећу по Немачку, Моргентауов 
план је замењен Маршаловим који јој је обезбедио индустријску обнову. И за 
транзиционе земље потребно је, у складу с поставкама и праксом Другог 
канона, који потиче од економске политике Хенрија VII, приступити 
реиндустријализацији, као нужном услову оживљавања привреда и изласка 
из дуготрајне кризе. 
 
Кључне речи: Стандардна теорија, Други канон, Вашингтонски 
консензус, транзициона криза, неокласична економија, индустријализација, 
Моргентауов план, Маршалов план, развој 
 
Introduction 
 
 Тwenty years of the implementing reforms in transition process in eastern european 
countries made too many evidences for a comprehensive estimation of this process. The 
foundations and the results of transition can be objective observed and the perspectives for 
these countries concluded. After the catastrophical decade of 1990’s, with deep transition (or 
transformational) crisis, the years at the beginning of 21 century brought the encouraging 
tendencies in the most of these countries. However, the results (production and living 
standard) from the years of pre-transition were not reashed. And the recent financial and 
economic crisis shows how much these countries are far from promised prosperity and 
welfare. 
 The long-term crisis of transitional economies (and societies) is the result of the 
implemented neoclassical model of transformation and requires the serious examination the 
foundations of transition process and the search new ways for their development. The 
purpose of this paper is to consider both of these aims, with special attempt to present the 
results of transition process in Serbia. 
 The new development strategy for Serbia, also other transition countries, must 
consider the ideas of alternative economic theory, that is derived from the Other canon wich 
have they origins as far from the economic policy of Henry VII. So, these countries can 
acess re-industrialization, which is the necessity for renewall of economies, and for 
overcoming the long-term crisis. 
 
Foundations of transition proces 
 
 The Fall of the Berlin Wall 1989 and the end of cold war are certainly the most 
significient events at the end of the XX century. They lead the countries of Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe to a fundamental problem: how to make a transition from planned 
towards market-based economy, but they also created an ambient, in which it would be 
possible to discuss, without prejudice and ideological burden, among the others the role of 
the State in economic development. Unfortunately, the mainstream economics’ thought – as 
a result of the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory – hampered this consideration of 
two fundamentally different economic outlooks: a production-centered and activistic-
idealistic (Renaissance) tradition and a barter-centered and passivistic-materialistic tradition 
of Smith, Ricardo and neo-classical economics [Reinert 1999, p. 270]. 
 Without pre-made recipes for development of market institutions and market 
economy, or, as it was the case with yugoslav experience since the beginning of 1950s, 
simply supressed, creators of the changes in this countries accepted foreign experts and 
recipes issued by international financial institutions with IMF in front. In their basis were 
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neo-classical postulats, ideas of “natural harmony” created by the market mechanism, that 
recent make the core mainstream in economic thought. “Natural harmony”, or a world void 
of any systemic effects, world of Samuelson's factor price equalisation [Samuelson 1948], 
will make all wage earners of all the world equally rich – if we can only “get the prices 
right” and “provide a level playing field”. The dominance of neoclassical economics was the 
decisive factor in determining the transition strategy. Consequently, there was no debate on 
goal, method and ideology underpinning the transition process. 
 Although the recommended prescriptions were at first geografically and historically 
specific, and were meant to solve problems of Latin America, former socialist countries 
similarly have they accept, as well as the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Quickly, they 
were became “the general wisdom for growth and development policy“ [Marangos 2009, p. 
197]. These recipes are known as Washington Consensus, the term coined by J. Wiliamson 
in 1989 [Wiliamson 1990]. Originally, the Consensus policies are next (table 1, left column). 
Reformers in these countries, and their advisors, emphasized that transition would bring 
temporary crisis, and then, very soon, the economies would renewal, and their new 
ownership structure will ensure a quick compensation for the temporary decrease and then a 
quick growth and catching up with developed countries. 
 The goal of reforms had to be competitive capitalism, the methodology neoclassical 
economics, and the ideological foundation self-interest. The individual conditions of each 
country was not in concern. The debate on transition was restricted to the speed of reform. 
The only concern was whether transition economies should immediately liberalise, stabilise, 
and privatise, that required so-called shock-therapy approach, or implement the neoclassical 
policies gradualistic, at a slow pace (gradualist approach).1 
 But, as was shown in [Marangos 2002], debate between the supporters of two 
approaches, in fact was immaterial. Both transition approaches adopted a combination of 
shock-therapy and gradualist strategies. In Serbia, this was also the case, although the 
transition process had many special characteristics, as a result of the known events in the 
1990’s. 
 
Table 1. Original and augmented Washington Consensus 
 
Original Washington Consensus "Augmented" Washington Consensus, the 
previous 10 items, plus: 
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Corporate governance 
2. Reorientation of public expenditures 12. Anti-corruption 
3. Tax reform 13. Flexible labor markets 
4. Financial liberalization 14. WTO agreements 
5. Unified and competitive exchange rates 15. Financial codes and standards 
6. Trade liberalization 16. “Prudent”capital-account opening 
7. Openness to FDI 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Privatization 18. Independent central banks/inflation 
targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social safety nets 
10. Secure Property Rights 20. Targeted poverty reduction 
 
Source: [Williamson 1990]; [Rodrik 2003; 2006] 
                                                          
1 The term “shock-therapy” is serived from Poland’s stabilisation and liberalization program iniciated 
on January 1, 1990. However, even Poland later pursued gradualist policies that appear more 
successful than those under shock therapy. 
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 What mean principles of Washington Consensus? Let we see (items on table 1). 
1) Means that public revenues should cover public expenditures, because budget 
deficit lead to inflation and to balance of payments deficit. 
2) This suggested switching expenditure, in a progrowth and propoor way, from 
things like nonmerit subsidies to basic health care, education, and infrastructure. 
3) The aim is a tax system that would combine a broad tax base with moderate 
marginal tax rates. This would increase fiscal, and then total public revenues. 
4) If exist control of interest rates, it must be cancelled. 
5) Central Bank has to ensure that appreciated domestic currency does not jeopardise 
the competitiveness of domestic economy in external trade. 
6) As generall approach, without pointing out the swiftness of its application. 
7) It doesn’t refer to comprehensive capital account, but only to FDI, in the meaning 
that all foreigners should be able to invest, build or buy something, and should be 
able to do that without limitations. 
8) It is assumed that privatization, if conducted properly, is beneficial, wheter 
privatized enterprises do business in competitive market, wheter they are regulated. 
9) It refers, primarily, to removal of barriers to entry given market, which increases 
competition, as well as the exit barriers for firms, not а removal regulation of safety 
of production, ecology regulation, or economic regulation in case of natural 
monopolies. 
10) It is necessary to ensure to gain property rights at an acceptable cost. 
 Is this set of policies acceptable? Williamson emphasized uniqueness of 1989 
[Williamson 2003, p. 11], and critics of Consensus emphasized that some of the important 
policies are missing, for example social equality and institutional development.2 This is 
unquestionable, and therefore Williamson later supplemented the program, and named it 
After the Washington Consensus [Williamson 2006]. However, it’s important to estimate 
original policies, because they were practically implemented. It’s clear that in these 
evaluations couldn’t be (and shouldn’t be) a consensus, but still, surprisingly, there are many 
our economists that fully support these policies. In my opinion, uncritical relation toward 
policies of the Consensus can’t be good – they must be considered individually in the 
context of specific economy and concrete period of time . 
 The ideas derived from the Washington Consensus had a huge influence on the 
economic reforms of many countries, among them on postcommunist countries, although the 
way these countries interpreted these ideas varied significantly. However, the orginal 
policies reigned unchallenged for only a short time. International economic and political 
circumstances has been changed, as well as domestic condition in reforming countries. So 
appeared new problems and the original proponents of the Consensus had to search for new 
answers. These answers often complemented the original recommendations of the 
Consensus, but not always. Also, new goals, more complex and difficult, were constantly 
added to the list of requirements, so the final frontier of the reform process became mere 
preconditions for success. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The first who wrote about Consensus failure to see crucial role of institutions in economic 
development was Naím Moisés. He also said the Consensus policies had to be seen merely as „first 
stage“ or „first generation“ reform. (Latin America’s Journey to the Market: From Economic Shocks 
to Institutional Therapy, San Francisco, 1995. According [Moisés 2000].) 
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Results of the transition process: the case of Serbia 
 
 Through the reforms, the institutional ambient in transition countries has been 
radically changed: for most prices a free price system was introduced, foreign exchange was 
liberalized, subsidies were cut, currencies were devaluated and made convertable, restrictive 
credit policy was introduced, borders were open for foreign capital, most of the state-owned 
enterprises were privatized. In most cases, it is all done by “shock therapy” (all, right now, 
at the same time). The applied model assumed that the market institutions would 
spontaneously lead to capitalism, as soon as the ownership was privatized, prices were free, 
currency was stabilized and free competitive market was established. The economy should, 
after a short period of crisis, spontaneously lead to the renewal of production and economic 
growth. 
 These changes, however, weren’t backed with proper and suitable changes in real 
sector. The results achieved are well known, and there is no point in repeating them here. 
They undoubtedly show failure. 
 The implementation of reforms prescribed in Washington Consensus and after gave 
not expected results. These results cannot be marked as good: instead of the promised 
prosperity, the majority of countries measured a great and a long-term fall in GDP, industrial 
production and living standard. The former yugoslav republics were not an exception. Not 
even Slovenia, with all its specificities and a refusal to apply some of the IMF policies (i.e. 
Washington Consensus), with annual GDP growth around 2%, cannot be satisfied. Serbia, 
fell almost 30% of its value in 1989, is in a similar situation as the Ukraine and Moldavia, 
whose decrease is between 40% and 50%. The official statistical methodology in Serbia 
meanwhile was changed, so the consistent time series of GDP (or earlier gross domestic 
material product) cannot be found. On figure 1 therefore were two data series shown: the 
gross domestic (material) product (for period 1989–2004) and gross domestic product (for 
period 1997–2009). Both series, as the other data in this paper, not included the data for the 
Autonomous Province Kosovo i Metohija. 
 
 
Figure 1. Gross domestic and gross domestic (material) product of Serbia 
Note: for 2009 preliminary data 
Source: [Републички завод за статистику 2008; 2010a] 
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 Greatest losses, not only in Serbia, were in industry. The industrial output in Serbia 
in 2009 is on the level of 39% related to 1989 (figure 2), many branches drastically 
decreased output, and some seized to exist .3 As the industry is moving force of 
technological progress, an engine to economic growth and creator of synergetic effects in all 
economy4, this presentation of its decrease is by itself enough to mark the whole period as 
“negative”. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Industrial output in Serbia (1989=100) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on [Републички завод за статистику 2010b] 
 
 In most transition countries, the economic crisis was followed by other negative 
consequences, such as a great demographic crisis – decline in population, spread of the 
diseases, a drop in fertillity, increase in mortality. Stuckler and the co-authors tested the 
hypothese that it was the mass privatization that caused the increase in mortality in the post-
communist countries [Stuckler et al., 2009]. UNICEF has estimated 3.256.000 „excess“ 
deaths in transition countries, for the decade 1990–1999 (without Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Georgia for 1993, Tajikistan for 1996–1999, and FR Yugoslavia for 1999) [UNICEF 2001, 
p. 49]. The depth of demographic crisis is probably best illustrated by the Russian Cross, 
firstly detected in 1992 in Russia: curves of dynamics of live births and deaths were crossed. 
Same happened in Serbia (figure 3), but the trend of approaching and intersecting of these 
curves is not clearly seen, as in Russia. 
 Transition resulted in great social expenses – increased poverty, increased 
unemployment, increased inequality, aggravation of public services and their polarization, 
criminal, increase in corruption and citizen unrest.5 Finally, we should point out vast 
external obligations, which happened inspite of great privatization revenues and great inflow 
of foreign remittance in case of Serbia. Estimations of all inflows (privatization, foreign 
direct investments, foreign remittance) are different, from 30 even to 70 billions euro, only 
                                                          
3 It is great drop in 1999, a year in which Serbia was bombed by NATO. That factor and others during 
the 1990s (economic sanctions, wars in the surrounding republics) are not to be underestimated. 
However, a drastic drop of industrial output is clearly seen. Meanwhile, we can see that industrial 
output moved, similar to other transition countries [Blanchard 1996], like an U-pattern, but just to 
1999, when this evolution was broken. This same can be seen on the figure 1. 
4 This was described in 1613 by italian mercantilist A. Serra [Serra 1952 /1613/]. 
5 Also for first decade of transition [Ellman 2000]. 
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for the period since 2000. This huge inflow wasn’t directed in production, or to rebuild 
tragically underdeveloped infrastructure, but in consumption from import. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Natural population changes in Serbia 1950–2009 
Source: [Републички завод за статистику 2010c] 
 
 For this enormous consumption growth from import almost always is blamed the 
relative appreciation of RSD, but not foreign exchange liberalization which was swiftly and 
uncritically conducted at the beginning of the decade, according to requirements of 
Consensus. According this argumentation, appreciated exchange rate destimulates export 
and stimulates import. Both sides of argumentation, however, are questionable: source of 
inlow from which the foreign currency is bought and the imported goods are payed should 
be taken into consideration when we talk about import, and more detailed explanations are 
necessary when we talk about export. 
 
 
Figure 4. Indicators of external debt of Serbia 2001–2010 (%) 
Note: for 2010 first half 
Source: [Народна банка Србије 2010] 
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 It is wrongly assumed that RSD devaluation (depreciation) would increase 
competitiveness of our export, even if there is production that could be exported. 
Devaluation of RSD doesn’t change prices of our goods in foreign markets, so they wont be 
easier to export.6 It will only lead to redistribution between domestic manufacturers: more 
wealth will go to exporters (in RSD, nominally). Moving of export and import is not 
affected by nominal exchange rate, but its long term trend, expressed as real exchange rate 
[Tasić i Zdravković 2008]. It is well known that prices in our markets, for a long time, 
almost automatically adjust to EUR (previously with DM), and react very quickly to 
changes in exchange rates. So the effects of changes in exchange rate of RSD quickly 
disappears, and previous constellation is established, on higher nominal value. So what 
changes? 
 Next important moment of transition crisis is high external indebtedness of these 
countries. This indicator is also unequall between countries, and it is comforting to say that 
extreme indebtedness is phenomenon that exists in some other countries as well (above all, 
Greece). As we can see (figure 4), except in 2001, Serbia is, according to External debt/GDP 
indicator, in a group of medium indebted countries, although moving towards highly 
indebted countries at the end of period. Other indicator (External debt/Export), excluding 
2006–2008, shows significant and belongs to highly indebted countries. (See WB criteria on 
Table 2.) 
 
Table 2. Indebtedness according World Bank criteria 
 
Indicator Indebtedness 
High Medium Low 
External debt/GDP > 80% 48% – 80% < 48% 
External debt/export > 220% 132% – 220% < 132% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Structure of external debt of Serbia 2000–2010 
Note: for 2010 first half 
Source: [Народна банка Србије 2010] 
                                                          
6 It is possible to realized export with lower export prices (damping), and exporters would be 
compensated with greater amounts of RSD. But that kind of export promotion is not allowed, and aside 
from that, it would meant a spillover of value created in country. 
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 Of course, the structure, i.e. share of public and private sector in total debt is 
important. It is often emphasized as (relatively) favorable circumstance. According official 
data (figure 5), it realy seems so. However, I should be skeptic – who can guarantee that the 
state (tax payers) won`t pay back debts that isn’t hers and wasn’t guaranteed by the state? 
 
Perspectives for renewal and development 
 
 Intensity of negative changes and, especially, longevity of negative results of the 
transition process iniciate the review of the term transition crisis (or transformational 
recession [Kornai 1994]), or should determinate its new meaning. However, initiators and 
protagonists of reforms in these countries don`t want do, or are not able to see at first the 
reforms results. Or apply some of the well known evading techniques in facing them.7 Basic 
principles and strategies are not questioned, and the lack of results is explained by 
inconsistency in handling the reform, and by limitations set by politics, so that it is all 
brought down to a mere technical problem of reform undertaking. In that case, all debates 
about causes of crisis and possible means to prevent it, are stopped. Why does this happen? 
 But this debate is realy necessary. And for it to be succesfull, it must adress the 
core of the problem. The reconsideration of Consensus must be in focus, as well as its 
theoretical basis on which it was built and is sustained. Regardlessly that many countries 
were drawn to poverty, as a consequence of its recipes. So we must not think that the 
generall approach is good, and that only some of the policies and measures are bad, and not 
conducted properly. 
 Although Consensus was meant to solve “local problems”, their policies were soon 
accepted as a general approach for all developing countries. It is considered that it’s policies 
are enough to iniciate economic growth and remove stagnation. Great role of the free market 
within set of policies is the reason it`s often called neoliberal (even “neoliberal manifesto“), 
although Williamson emphasized that it’s not right, that term neoliberalism was coined to 
describe doctrines espoused by the Mont Pelerin Society, and that there are a number of 
distinctively neoliberal doctrines that are conspicuous by their absence policies of 
Consensus [Wiliamson 2003, p. 11].8 
 Of course, we must bear in mind that “reforms were uneven and remained 
incomplete“, as in Report emphasized IMF9, which is true, although the conclusion drawn 
(“According to its authors, the problem was not with the approach taken to reform, but that 
it did not go deep and far enough.“) is questionable. From this point of view, the failures 
have to be chalked up to too little reform of the kind that Consensus has advocated all along 
and not to the nature of these reforms itself. Also, the policy implication that follows is 
simple: do more of the same, and do it well. However, what has become clearer to 
practitioners of the Consensus over time is that the standard policy reforms did not produce 
lasting effects if the background institutional conditions were poor: sound policies needed to 
be embedded in solid institutions. The upshot is that the original Consensus has been 
augmented by a long list of so-called “second-generation“ reforms that are heavily 
institutional in nature (table 2, right column) [Rodrik 2003 p. 42; 2006, p. 978]. 
 As the starting point, we can use the experience of the renewall of Germany after 
the WWII. Feared that Germany could once again cause war, the allies accepted in 1944 a 
                                                          
7 See more detailed consideration in [Буквић 2010]. 
8 The origin of Neoliberalism can be found some erlier, namely in the time of 1930s, in pre-war 
Germany, when the German Freiberg School was active [Boas & Gans-Morse 2009, p. 145]. 
9 According to [Rodrik 2006 /2004/, p. 977]. 
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plan that ought to disindustrialize and make it an agrar country. Industrial machines should 
be removed, mines closed and filled with water and cement. The Germany should be turned 
into a land of small farmers. Then it would a peacefull nation, and the closer contact to the 
land and agriculture would bring moral restoration and pacification of its people.10 The 
author of plan was H. Morgenthau.11 Plan became active as soon as Germany was defeated, 
in 1945.12 It has become obvious in 1946 and 1947 that the plan created great problems. 
Former US president H. Hoover lead the team of experts to visit Germany and to report 
about the nature and the causes of problems. In the last report he emphasized main illusion 
about the development of Germany: “There is the illusion that the new Germany (...) can be 
reduced to a ͵Pastoral Stateʹ. It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 
people out of it“ [Hoover 1947, p. 28]. Hoover’s reports again discovered the core of old 
mercantilistic theory of population: “Industrial nation can maintain and nourish many people 
than it can agriculture state at the same place.“13 Just as A. Smith emphasized: “the 
difference is very great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters whom the same 
extent of equally fertile territory can maintain“ [Smit 1970 /1776/, p. 869], with implications 
on defense power of the country. This means that industrialization increases country 
sustainability. 
 
Table 3. Basic characteristic of Marshall’s and Morgenthau’s plans 
 
Marshall’s plans Morgenthau’s plans 
Creates “improved” Exclusively creates “improved” 
Schumpeterian activities: Malthusian activities: 
(= ‘good’ export activities) (= ‘bad’ export activities if no 
Schumpeterian sector present) 
Specialising brings increasing returns / 
economies of scale 
After a certain point, specialisation will 
cause unit production costs to rise causes 
diminishing returns 
Dynamic imperfect competition „Perfect competition“ 
High growth activities Low growth activities 
Price stability Extreme price fluctuations 
Generally skilled labour Generally unskilled labour 
Creates a middle class Creates ‘feudalist’ class structure 
Irreversible wages 
(‘Stickiness’ of wages) 
Reversible wages 
Technical change leads to higher wages to 
the producer (‘Fordist wage regime’) 
Technical change tends to lower price to 
consumer 
Creates large synergies  (linkages, clusters) Creates few synergies 
 
Source: [Reinert 2006 /2004/, p. 100] 
 
                                                          
10 Similarity of Morgenthau plan and Washington consensus I was at first time emphasized in [Bukvić 
2010a]. 
11 Term Morgenthau's Plan usualy has been used either to designate the described agreement or to 
mean any postwar program designed to effect and preserve German disarmament by significantly 
reducing its industrial might [Gareau 1961, p. 517]. Second meaning can be enlarged to any plan that 
leaves out industrialization as a factor to a country development. 
12 See original in [Irving 1986] or more detailed description of Morgenthau's Plan in [Chase 1954]. 
13 According to [Reinert 2006 /2004/, p. 100]. 
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Table 4. Means for national economic development 
 
1. Acceptance that wealth is created in relations between activities with increasing 
returns and continuous mechanization. Understanding that the state is in wrong “field 
of specialization“. Aware of policies it supports, stands for and protects these 
activities. 
2. Temporal monopoly should be given to these activities in certain geographic area / 
patents / and customs protections. 
3. Acceptance that economic development is synergetic fenomenon, so that diversity and 
division of labor in economy are imposed. “Maximizing labor division and number of 
jobs in country“ (A. Serra) and copying economic structure of Venice and Holland. 
4. Theoretical understanding that industrialization (and advanced service activities) 
simultaneously solve four great economic problems of poor countries: increase value 
added, increase employment, increase wages and decrease balance of payment deficit. 
5. Significance of attracting competent labor from abroad (which is more important than 
foreign capital). This was already very important in England, in the period of Tudor 
dynasty (throughout the history, many nations deprived themselves of most educated 
citizens through religious persecution). 
6. Relative oppression of large landowners. From Florence in XIII century through 
England since 1485, to South Korea after WWII. Physiocracy (the foundation of 
standard economics) was a revolt of large landowners against that kind of policy. 
7. Tax incentives for economic activities we wish to develop. 
8. Inexpensive loans for same activities. 
9. Export support for same activities. 
10. Helping to increase arable land and incentives to agriculture in general, although we 
must bear in mind that agriculture itself cannot drive the country out of poverty. 
11. Focus on education and knowledge. 
12. Patents protection for new inventions. 
13. Export duties and export prohibitions so that raw materials would become more 
expensive for foreign industry (used in England in XVI century, with great efficiency, 
in order to break Italian textile industry). 
 
Source: [Reinert 2006 /2004/, pp. 44–46] 
 
 Within less than three months Morgenthau plan was quietly stopped. Instead 
Marshall’s plan was introduced, which goal was the reindustrialization of Germany and 
other parts of Europe. The plan was inaugurated in june of 194714 with the explanation 
which has already been known since the beginning of XVII century thanks to the A. Serra, 
that production of raw materials and industrial production are subject to different laws.15 
                                                          
14 Marshall’s expose discovers the core of the relationship between industry and agriculture: „Peasant 
has always produced food to be exchanged for other goods with the people that live in cities. This 
division of labor is the fundament of our modern civilisation. It now treatens to break. Industries in 
cities are not producing enough goods to be traded with peasants who produce food (...) Meantime, 
there are shortages of food and kindling material and in lot of places, people are getting close to 
starvation. Therefore Governments must use their external reserves to buy necessary goods abroad (...) 
Modern system of the division of labor on wich commodity exchange is based, is in danger and could 
fall apart.“ (According to [Reinert 2006 /2004/, p. 122.]) 
15 See [Serra 1952 /1613/, ch. 3]. 
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These arguments were used after the end of WWII in favor that raw-material production 
based countries also needed industrial sector. Recent mainstream in economic science, 
unfortunately, based on neoliberal dogma, forgot this opinions, and through its enforcers, 
with IMF on the head, even directly forbid the poor countries to develop industry forcing 
them on “equal“ competition with industrial developed countries. The same countries that 
used opposite policies for their development, than those enforced on poor countries. 
 Because Marshall’s plan is today wrongly identified with any plan that brings great 
resources to the poor countries, overlooking its essence – (re)industrialization, it’s necessary 
to specify its main characteristics and differences to Morgenthau’s plan (table 3). 
 
Table 5. Two different types of economic theory 
 
Foundations of todays mainstream theory 
(standard canon) 
The other canon foundation (“Alternatrive 
theory“) 
Equillibrium under perfect information and 
perfect foresight 
Learning and decision-making under 
uncertanity (Schumpeter, Keynes, Shackle) 
High level of abstraction Level of abstraction chosen according to 
problem to be resolved 
Man’s wit and will absent Moving force : Geist – und Willenskapital ; 
Man’s wit and will, enterpreneurship 
Innovation and new knowledge are not the 
(inner) moving force. Moving force: “capital 
per se propels the capitalist engine“ 
Moving force: New knowledge which 
creates a demand for capital to be provided 
from financial sector. 
Metaphores are chosen from realm of 
physics. 
Metaphors are (mainly) chosen from the 
realm of biology 
Mode of understanding (is) 
Machanistic(“begreifen”) 
Modes of understanding are Qualitative 
(“verstehen”). A type of understanding 
irreducible only to numbers and symbols 
Matter (Materialism) Will and wit (capital) (innovation and 
enterpreneurship) precedes matter. 
Focused on Man the consumer (Adam 
Smith: “Man are animals which have 
learned to barter.“) 
Focused on Man the Innovator and Producer 
(Abraham Lincoln: “Man are animals which 
not only work, but innovate.“) 
Focused on static (World as a photography) Focused on change (World as a film/movie) 
Histoy absent, no cumulative effects Cumulative causations. History matters, 
backwash effects (Myrdal, Kaldor, 
Schumpeter, German Historical School) 
Increasing returns at large scales are not 
essential feature 
Increasing returns, or its absence, are 
essential to explaining differences in income 
between firms, regions and nations (Kaldor) 
Seeks to be very precise. (its better to be 
accurately wrong, than approximately 
correct) 
Relevance is more essential than precision. 
A core issue in the economy is trade-off 
between relevance and precision 
„Perfect competition“. (Commodity 
competiton and price competition) is an 
ideal situation for society 
Innovation and knowledge based 
competition is ideal, and engine to progress. 
Perfect competition,with equilibrium and no 
innovation makes capital worthless. 
(Schumpeter, Hayek) 
The market is a mechanism for setting prices Market is also an arena for rivalry,and a 
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mechanism for selecting different products 
and solutions (Schumpeter, Nelson & 
Winter) 
Starting assumption for equality : no 
diversity 
Diversity is a key factor (Schumpeter, 
Shackle) 
Second assumption for equlity: All 
economic activities are alike, and of equal 
quality as carriers of economic growth and 
welfare 
Growth and welfare are activity specific. 
Different economic activities present widely 
different potentials for for absorbing new 
knowledge. 
Both theory and policy tend to be 
independant of context. (“one medicine 
cures all“) 
Both theory and policy recommendations are 
highly context dependant  
The economy is largely independant from 
society. 
The economy is firmly embedded in society 
Technology is taken as a free good, as 
“manna from heaven“ 
Knowledge and technology is produced, 
have cost and are protected. This production 
is based on incentives of the system, law, 
institutions  and policies 
Equillibrating forces are at the core of 
system and theory. 
Cumulative forces are more important than 
equillibrating ones , and should therefore be 
the core of the system 
Economy is science of harmony: Economy 
is self-regulating system seeking 
equillibrium and harmony. 
Economy is characterised by inner instability 
and conflicts. Stablity doesnt come by itself, 
it has to be based on policy measures (Carey, 
Polanyi, Weber, Keynes) 
Postulates the representative or typical firm There are no „representative firm“.All firms 
are unique (Penrose) 
Static optimum. Perfect rationality Dynamic optimization under uncertainty. 
Bounded rationality 
No distinction is made between real 
economy and financial economy. 
Conflict between real economy and financial 
economy are normal and must be regulated 
(Minsky, Keynes) 
Saving is caused by refraining from 
consumtion and a cause of growth. 
Saving largely results from profits, not by 
refraining of consumption(Schumpeter) and 
saving per se is not useful or desirable for 
growth (Keynes) 
 
Source: [Reinert 2006 /2004/, pp. 151–153] 
 
 It is clearly shown what measures needs to be taken, as well as the current position 
of transition countries, and Serbia. And to make everything perfectly clear, here is the list of 
measures used from the time of Henry VII in England (1485) until South Korea (1960s), 
later banned by World Bank and IMF (table 4). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The analysis of the neoclassical model in both approaches (shock therapy or 
gradualist) reveals the internal inconsistencies of each [Marangos 2002]. The 
implementation of this model in either form, or its combination, had to varying degrees 
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common outcomes. These were inflation, reduced output, unemployment, external 
imbalances, destruction of welfare system, corruption. Although the neoclassical economists 
had presented these outcomes as “short-term necessary adjustment”, the transition countries 
are, with some exceptions, still in great depression. Contrary to ordinary opinions, that 
transition crisis show as result of inconsistency in reforms taking, we can say that this is 
normaly its result. The transition countries had to search, and now search, new paths for 
development and renewal its economies. Serbia is there not alone.16 In this sense, the 
differences between two types of economic theory (table 5) must be seriously considered. 
 It should be underlined that, although it seems that the situation is clear, in reality 
that’s not the case. Not because we should question these arguments and ideas – it is 
necessary to that every time. The point is something else. Current trends in world are more 
interdependent than ever, and very few countries, especially not Serbia, are able to carry out 
its own, independent policy. Financial capital has more power today than ever, and is  
heavily bounded with states policy, especially in USA, and large corporations, creating so 
called “Oligarchic triad”17 (WallStreet + US Treasury + IMF) that holds true political and 
economic authority in whole world. 
 So, the most important question today is – could the logic of today`s modern 
capitalism (casino capitalism) i.e. financial capital, be broken? It`s not only about offered 
programs 18, it is essential if there is enough social strength capable for that. Same is to be 
considered for our country – are there forces that could lead us from ruling (neoliberal) 
concept that leads to poverty, towards industrial oriented concept which could lead the 
country towards development? Much has been spoken about new models of development, 
based, among other, on renewal of industry, but the question whether it`s realistic or it`s just 
a political marketing for domestic use, remains. Does the will and capability to pursue 
autonomous policy exist? It`s not clearly shown today, and the economic mainstream 
doesn’t even recognize the necessity for that. 
 If the consensus about the later could be achieved, then the development strategy 
should be chosen without prejudice. It shouldn’t be based, not on ruling mainstream, but on 
postulats of almost forgotten “Other Canon”. If that kind of objective review could be done 
as necessary in USA long before ending of WWII19, there is no real reason not to be taken 
today. After all, even renaissance economists told us that the State exists because of the 
systemic effects in an economy, wich also the early A. Smith glorifies [Smit 2008 /1759/)]. 
A. Smith prior to his meetings with the French physiocrats. 
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